POST FINAL READ FORMATTED VERSION (DO NOT DELETE)

5/18/2013 5:31 PM

MARYLAND V. KING: THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT SPIRALS DOWN THE
DOUBLE HELIX
*

SITARA V. WITANACHCHI
I. INTRODUCTION
1

In Maryland v. King, the United States Supreme Court will
consider the constitutionality of Maryland’s DNA Collection Act (the
2
Act), which enables law enforcement to obtain DNA samples of
arrestees, enter the samples into a database, and compare the samples
3
to unknown DNA profiles for possible matches. Specifically, the
Court will consider whether DNA testing individuals arrested for
violent crimes violates the Fourth Amendment right to freedom from
4
unreasonable search and seizure. The novelty of the question before
5
the Court comes from the Act’s application to arrestees —the Court
will examine the nature of arrestees’ privacy expectations as
implicated by DNA testing. The Court will also consider the efficacy
of DNA testing as a law enforcement tool as well as its facilitation of
compelling government interests—resolving unsolved crimes and
aiding the law enforcement efforts of other states and of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. Upon balancing arrestees’ privacy interests
against the government’s interests in obtaining arrestees’ DNA, the
Court will likely find the government’s interests to be stronger. Thus,
the Court will hold post-arrest DNA testing reasonable and the Act
constitutional within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

*

J.D. Candidate, 2014, Duke University School of Law. I am grateful to Professors Joseph
Blocher and Nita Farahany for their guidance and support. I thank the members of DJCLPP, in
particular Tara McGrath and Jonathan Rash, for their insight and careful editing.
1. Maryland v. King, No. 12-207 (U.S. argued Feb. 26, 2013).
2. DNA Collection Act, MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504(a)(3) (West 2013).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, No. 12-207 (U.S. argued Feb. 26, 2013)
(Alito, J.) (“[B]y the way, I think this is perhaps the most important criminal procedure case
that this Court has heard in decades.”).
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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In September 2003, Vonette W. was raped and robbed in her home
6
by an unidentified individual. The recovered semen was submitted
7
for analysis to discover the perpetrator’s DNA profile. The resulting
profile did not match any pre-existing DNA profiles in the state or
8
federal databases.
In April 2009, respondent Alonzo Jay King, Jr. was arrested for an
9
unrelated incident in Wicimico County, Maryland, and charged with
10
first- and second-degree assault. Under the Act, an arrestee charged
with a crime of violence must provide a buccal swab for DNA
11
testing; because first-degree assault constitutes a crime of violence,
12
King was required to submit to a buccal swab. King’s DNA profile
was obtained from this swab and submitted to the FBI’s DNA
13
14
database system, known as CODIS. It was then compared to
15
unmatched DNA samples on file. King’s DNA profile matched the
previously unidentified DNA recovered following the rape of Vonette
16
W. King was ultimately charged with the rape and robbery of
17
Vonette W.
At trial, King raised a constitutional challenge to the Act, arguing
that requiring an arrestee to submit to a buccal swab constitutes a
18
warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. King
19
moved to suppress the DNA evidence. His suppression motion was

6. King v. State, 42 A.3d 549, 554 (Md.), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (No. 12-207).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 552.
10. Id.
11. DNA Collection Act, MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504(a)(3) (West 2013).
12. King v. State, 42 A.3d 549, 552 (Md.), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (No. 12-207).
13. Brief of Petitioner at 4, Maryland v. King, No. 12-207 (U.S. Dec. 26, 2012).
14. Congress authorized the FBI to establish a national database of DNA profiles of
convicted persons. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, § 210304(a)(1)–(3), 108 Stat. 2069 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14132). Under
this authority, the FBI created the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), a coordinated
system of federal, state, and local databases designed to permit participating law enforcement
agencies to submit profiles and to search profiles within the compiled database. See CODIS
Brochure, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/codis_brochure (last visited Feb. 13, 2013).
15. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 13, at 4.
16. King, 42 A.3d at 553.
17. Id. at 554.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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denied, and on July 27, 2010, he was convicted of first-degree rape.
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Special Appeals of
21
Maryland. The appeal was removed to the Court of Appeals of
Maryland, which held that the Act was unconstitutional as applied to
22
King and reversed King’s conviction. The State of Maryland
23
appealed that decision to the United States Supreme Court.
Concerned with the impact the Maryland Court of Appeals’s
holding could have on public safety initiatives, the State applied for a
stay of judgment pending the Supreme Court’s disposition of the
24
petition for writ of certiorari. Chief Justice Roberts granted the
25
motion, finding: (1) “a reasonable probability” that the Court would
grant certiorari; (2) “a fair prospect” that it would reverse the decision
below; and (3) “a likelihood that irreparable harm [would] result from
26
the denial of a stay.”
Looking to the first element, Roberts noted that approximately
half of the states and the federal government have adopted similar
statutes providing for DNA sampling and the compilation of DNA
27
databases as a law enforcement tool; these various DNA databases
28
are often checked against one another for matches. Roberts
conveyed a concern that the decision below may decrease the
effectiveness of other states’ DNA database systems and of the FBI’s
29
federal database system. Thus, the case appeared to be a good
candidate for a grant of certiorari.
Jumping to the third element, Roberts noted that if Maryland was
forced to shut down its DNA databases, even temporarily, irreparable
30
harm was likely for two reasons. First, there is an inherent harm to
the public interest when a State is enjoined from the application of a
31
statute passed by the representatives of its people. Second, the
20. Id.
21. Id. at 555.
22. Id. at 581.
23. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 594 (No. 12-207).
24. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration or Alternatively, for Stay of Enforcement of
the Mandate, King v. Maryland, 42 A.3d 549 (Md. 2012) (No. 68).
25. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1, 3 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers) (granting the
State of Maryland’s motion for stay of judgment).
26. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 448 U.S. 1306, 1308 (1980) (Brennan, J., in chambers)
(establishing the three elements required for a motion for stay to be granted).
27. King, 133 S. Ct. at 2 (Roberts, C.J., in chambers).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 3.
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decision below harms public safety interests because DNA sampling
has empirically proven to be a valuable tool for Maryland law
32
enforcement. Finally, as to the second element, Roberts concluded,
without any elaboration, that there is a “fair prospect” that the
33
Maryland Court of Appeals’s holding will be reversed.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Maryland DNA Collection Act
In relevant part, the Maryland DNA Collection Act requires an
34
individual charged with a crime of violence to submit a buccal swab.
Because Maryland’s forensic laboratory collaborates with the
35
National DNA Index System (NDIS), extracted DNA samples are
36
analyzed according to FBI standards. The material from the buccal
swab is converted into a DNA profile unique to the owner of the
sample through the following process: Under FBI standards, DNA is
37
found on the chromosomes in the nuclei of the extracted cells.
38
Testing is done on parts of the chromosome referred to as loci.
32. See id. (“According to Maryland, from 2009—the year that Maryland began collecting
samples from arrestees—to 2011, ‘matches from arrestee swabs [from Maryland] have resulted
in 58 criminal prosecutions.’” (citation omitted)).
33. Id. at 2.
34. Under the Act, DNA samples may be collected from individuals charged with “[a]
crime of violence,” “burglary,” or an attempt to commit either. DNA Collection Act, MD.
CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504(a)(3) (West 2013). When the DNA sample is collected, the
arrestee is to be informed that the DNA record “may be expunged and the DNA sample
destroyed” in accordance with § 2-511. Id. DNA evidence that has been recovered from “a
crime scene or collected as evidence of sexual assault at a hospital” is to be tested “as soon as
reasonably possible” if a law enforcement investigator considers the evidence “relevant to the
identification or exoneration of a suspect.” Id.
35. NDIS is a subset of CODIS; NDIS contains all DNA profiles contributed by federal,
state, and local participating forensic laboratories. States participating in NDIS must comply
with the FBI standards of DNA testing and specific requirements for participation stipulated in
the DNA Identification Act of 1994. See Frequently Asked Questions on the CODIS Program
and the National DNA Index System, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last visited Feb. 13, 2013)
(citing DNA Identification Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14132).
36. The DNA Identification Act of 1994 requires, among other things, that laboratories
participating in NDIS must: (1) comply with the quality assurance standards issued by the FBI
director; (2) be accredited by a nationally-recognized, nonprofit professional association of
individuals actively engaged in forensic science; and (3) undergo an external audit every two
years to confirm compliance with the FBI Director’s quality assurance standards. See DNA
Identification Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 14132 (West 2013).
37. See Frequently Asked Questions on the CODIS Program and the National DNA Index
System, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/lab/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last visited Feb. 13, 2013).
38. DNA testing in conformance with FBI standards consists of using the polymerase
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Thirteen loci were specifically chosen by the FBI for DNA analysis
because they contain non-coding DNA, which the FBI believed did
not include personal information such as medical susceptibilities and
39
behavioral traits. Rather, the FBI thought that non-coding DNA
revealed information “no more intimate than the particular blood
serum enzyme that an individual happens to have, the pattern of
blood vessels in the retina of the eye, or the whorls and ridges in a
40
fingerprint.”
The resulting DNA profile is stored and collected along with
41
others in Maryland’s DNA database. Because this collection is
42
strictly regulated to follow FBI testing standards, Maryland is only
permitted to gather “DNA records that directly relate to the
43
identification of the individuals.” If an arrestee is not ultimately
convicted, the Act requires that the DNA record be destroyed within
44
sixty days. If the record is willfully not destroyed or misused, or if the
DNA sample is tested in a manner not authorized by the Act, there
45
are statutory penalties.

chain reaction (PCR) method, which replicates 13 core short-tandem-repeat (STR) loci. On the
loci, short sequences of base pairs repeat themselves. The number of times the sequences repeat
themselves varies from person to person. The DNA profile is represented as a numerical
depiction of this information found on the loci. See id.
39. See id.; accord MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-505(b)(1) (“Only DNA records that
directly relate to the identification of individuals shall be collected and stored.”).
40. D.H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on Arrest, 10 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 455, 461–62 (2001).
41. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-501.
42. See id. § 2-503(b) (“Each procedure adopted by the Director shall include quality
assurance guidelines to ensure that DNA records meet standards and audit requirements that
submit DNA records for inclusion in the statewide DNA data base system and CODIS.”);
accord Storing Typing Results, MD. CODE REGS. 29.05.01.09(A) (2011) (“Blood, body fluid, or
tissue samples shall be analyzed according to State Police protocol and standard operating
procedures by personnel qualified under the FBI standards and CODIS requirements.”).
43. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-505(b)(1).
44. Id. § 2-511.
45. An individual is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to imprisonment
not exceeding five years or a fine not exceeding $5000 for committing any of the following
violations: willfully accessing DNA information without authorization, willfully disclosing said
information to others not authorized to receive it, and/or willfully testing the DNA sample for
information that does not relate to identification. Id. § 2-512. If an individual willfully fails to
destroy the DNA sample pursuant to an order to destroy it, she is guilty of a misdemeanor and
on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding $1000.
Id.
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As originally enacted in 1994, the Act applied solely to convicted
46
felons. The first Fourth Amendment challenge to the Act, State v.
47
Raines, included a fact pattern strikingly similar to the one here, with
one major divergence—the defendant was a convicted felon as
48
opposed to an arrestee. However, the Maryland Court of Appeals
upheld the Act as applied to convicted felons in light of their reduced
49
expectation of privacy. The Act was amended in 2008 to include
persons arrested for violent crimes among the class of individuals
50
required to submit to DNA testing.
B. Fourth Amendment Analysis: The Focus on Reasonableness
As a general rule, government searches must be authorized by
51
judicial warrants issued on the basis of probable cause. However, the
Supreme Court has effectively whittled away the warrant requirement
52
over time. Today, in practice, the ex ante issuance of a warrant has
become the exception as opposed to the rule, making Fourth
Amendment analysis more often an ex post assessment of the
53
reasonableness of the intrusion in question.

46. See Act of May 13, 2008, ch. 337, § 1, 2008 Md. Laws (codified as amended at MD.
CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504(a)(3) (2008)) (amending MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2504 to include arrestees of violent crimes in addition to convicted offenders).
47. 857 A.2d 19 (Md. 2004).
48. See id. at 23 (framing the issue around the privacy interests of the convicted offender).
49. Id. at 29.
50. Act of May 13, 2008 § 1. The amended provision took effect on January 1, 2009 and
will expire after December 31, 2013. Id. § 4.
51. See Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989) (“[W]e
have often emphasized, and reiterate today, that a search must be supported, as a general
matter, by a warrant issued upon probable cause.”).
52. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968) (noting the impracticality of the warrant
requirement for certain police-civilian encounters and using a reasonableness test to assess
whether the search/seizure violated the Fourth Amendment); see also Scott E. Sundby, A
Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camera and Terry, 72 MINN. L.
REV. 383, 393–94 (noting that Camara “reversed the roles of probable cause and
reasonableness”: Prior to Camara, “[a] search or arrest was reasonable only when a warrant
based on probable cause issued,” but after Camara “reasonableness, in the form of the
balancing test, defined probable cause” (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539
(1967))).
53. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855 n.4 (2006) (“The touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment is reasonableness, not individualized suspicion.”); see also William J. Stuntz,
Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 922 (1991) (noting that in
contemporary practice, “warrants are presumptively required for searches of the home or office
and for wiretaps, but not for anything else”).
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54

The reasonableness of a warrantless administrative inspection is
assessed using the “totality of the circumstances balancing test,” set
55
forth in United States v. Knights, where the Supreme Court upheld a
56
warrantless search of a probationer’s apartment. There, the Court
held that the reasonableness of a search is determined by weighing
“the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy” against
“the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate
57
government interests.”
One’s involvement with the criminal justice system informs one’s
expectation of privacy. The Court has suggested a hypothetical
spectrum, with a convicted individual on one end and an ordinary
58
59
citizen on the other. The convicted offender’s privacy interests are
at a minimum and the ordinary citizen’s privacy interests are at a
60
maximum. Somewhere between these two points lie the probationer,
61
the parolee, the pre-trial detainee, and presumably, the arrestee. In
Knights, the Court held that the defendant’s expectation of privacy
62
was diminished because of his status as a probationer. The Court
54. Administrative searches include government searches of every person in a specific
location or involved in a specific activity. These searches are not supported by probable cause or
individualized suspicion; the reasonableness of the search is evaluated by balancing the
competing interests. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1983) (holding that the
warrant requirement was unsuitable for the maintenance of the swift disciplinary procedures
needed in a school and assessing the reasonableness of the intrusion). “[C]ommon examples [of
administrative searches] include checkpoints where government officials stop every car (or
every third car) driving on a particular roadway, and drug testing programs that require every
person involved in a given activity to submit to urinalysis.” Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling
Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 254, 262 (2011) (citations omitted).
55. 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
56. Id. at 112–13 (observing the link between one’s privacy expectation and one’s
placement on a “continuum of possible punishments ranging from solitary confinement . . . to a
few hours of mandatory community service”).
57. Id. (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
58. An “ordinary citizen” is an individual who has not entered the criminal justice system
and consequently has no physical relationship to the State.
59. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006) (“In evaluating the degree of
intrusion into Knights’ privacy, we found Knights’ probationary status ‘salient,’ observing that
‘probation is one point . . . on a continuum of possible punishments ranging from solitary
confinement in a maximum-security facility to a few hours of mandatory community service.’”
(citation omitted)).
60. See id. at 864 (“Threaded through the Court’s reasoning is the suggestion that
deprivation of Fourth Amendment rights is part and parcel of any convict’s punishment.”).
61. See id. (establishing that apprehended individuals with a physical relationship to the
State have diminished privacy interests, yet they are situated along a continuum based on the
seriousness of their physical relationship to the State).
62. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 119 (2001) (“Inherent in the very nature of probation is that
probationers ‘do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled.’” (quoting

POST FINAL READ FORMATTED VERSION (DO NOT DELETE)

254

5/18/2013 5:31 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

[VOL. 8

63

next held in Samson v. California that the parolee’s privacy interests
are even less than those of the probationer because a parolee’s
64
relationship to the State is comparatively more serious.
Sidling closer to addressing the privacy interests of arrestees, the
65
Court addressed those of pre-trial detainees in Bell v. Wolfish. In
Bell, the Court held that certain conditions pre-trial detainees endure,
including visual body-cavity searches after a contact visit, do not
66
infringe upon their privacy rights. Because administrative practices
are deemed necessary for managing pre-trial detainees, their privacy
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment are necessarily
67
reduced. Similarly, the Court’s holding in Florence v. Board of
68
Chosen Freeholders —that arrestees can be subjected to suspicionless
strip searches before entering prison—implies that arrestees possess
69
diminished privacy interests compared to those of ordinary citizens.
C. Federal Courts’ Assessment of DNA Testing Arrestees
To date, only two federal circuit courts have addressed the issue of
obtaining DNA samples from arrestees—the Court of Appeals for the
70
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Pool and the Court of Appeals for
71
the Third Circuit in United States v. Mitchell. In both cases, the courts
employed the Knights balancing test to affirm the reasonableness of
72
the warrantless DNA sampling of arrestees.
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972))).
63. 547 U.S. 842 (2006).
64. See id. at 843–44 (“Parolees, who are on the ‘continuum’ of state-imposed
punishments, have fewer expectations of privacy than probationers, because parole is more akin
to imprisonment than probation is.”).
65. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
66. Id. at 558–60 (“Admittedly, this practice gives us the most pause. However, assuming
for present purposes that inmates, both convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees, retain some
Fourth Amendment rights upon commitment to a corrections facility, we nonetheless conclude
that these searches do not violate the Fourth Amendment.”).
67. See id. at 557 (“[A]ny reasonable expectation of privacy that a detainee retained
necessarily would be of a diminished scope.” (citing Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143
(1962))).
68. 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2011).
69. See id. at 1522 (“Even assuming all the facts in favor of petitioner, the search
procedures at the Burlington County Detention Center and the Essex County Correctional
Facility struck a reasonable balance between inmate privacy and the needs of the institutions.”).
70. 621 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2010). The Ninth Circuit voted to rehear Pool en banc, United
States v. Pool, 646 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2011). While the en banc rehearing was pending, Pool
pleaded guilty, and the Ninth Circuit dismissed the case as moot. United States v. Pool, 659 F.3d
761 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
71. 652 F.3d 387 (3rd Cir. 2011).
72. See, e.g., id. at 403 (“We and the majority of circuits—the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
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In Pool, the defendant asserted a Fourth Amendment challenge to
amendments of the Bail Reform Act, which required arrestees to
73
provide a DNA sample as a condition of pre-trial release. The Ninth
Circuit determined that the defendant’s privacy interests were
74
reduced because of his arrestee status. The court applied the totality
of the circumstances test to assess the reasonableness of compelling a
75
DNA test from the defendant. Looking first to the degree of
intrusion on the defendant’s privacy interests, the court dismissed the
defendant’s argument that the information gathered from the sample
76
could be used for purposes other than identification. By both design
and law, the government had narrowed the scope of its DNA analysis
77
to identifying the individual, and so the court would not speculate on
78
potential government abuse. In contrast, the court found the State’s
79
interests to be considerable. First, the State had a noted interest in
80
using the most accurate means of identification available. The State
also had a recognized interest in learning the criminal background of
the arrestee to better determine whether the arrestee could be
81
released before trial without posing a danger to society. The court
found that the State’s interests outweighed the defendant’s privacy
82
interest and thus held that the amendments to the Bail Reform Act

Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia—have endorsed a totality of the
circumstances approach.” (citations omitted)).
73. Pool, 621 F.3d at 1215.
74. See id. at 1219 (“[The magistrate] noted that at this point, ‘the defendant may be
deprived of his very liberty . . . . Certainly the magistrate is correct that at this point the
government may, through the judiciary, impose conditions on an individual that it could not
otherwise impose on a citizen.” (citation omitted)).
75. See id. at 1220 (“However, our opinions suggest that there may be a pre-requisite to
the application of this [totality of the circumstances] test: there must be some legitimate reason
for the individual having less than the full rights of a citizen.”).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 1221–22 (“If, . . . and when, some future program permits the parade of
horribles the DNA Act’s opponents fear—unregulated disclosure of CODIS profiles to private
parties, genetic discrimination, state-sponsored eugenics, . . . —we have confidence that courts
will respond appropriately.”); see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 (1977) (assessing the
constitutionality of the challenged statute based on what the statute explicitly provides for as
opposed to speculations as to how the statue could be misapplied).
79. Id. at 1222–23.
80. See id. (“The government’s interests in DNA samples for law enforcement purposes
are well established. It is the most accurate means of identification available.” (citing Dist.
Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 55 (2009))).
81. See id. at 1225 (“In Pool’s case, the government seeks only his definitive identification
which it relates to its ability to check on his activities while on pre-trial release.”).
82. See id. at 1226 (“[W]here a court . . . [finds] probable cause . . . that the defendant
committed a felony, the government’s interest in definitively determining the defendant’s
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83

did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
In United States v. Mitchell, the defendant challenged the 2006
revision to the federal DNA Act, which added arrestees and pretrial
84
detainees to the class of individuals subject to DNA testing.
85
Applying the Knights balancing test, the Third Circuit found that the
86
State’s interests outweighed those of the individual. Without much
discussion, the court dismissed the argument that the procedure itself
87
poses a significant physical intrusion. Next, the court noted that the
88
extracted DNA material (referred to as “junk” DNA) used to create
the DNA profile does not contain personal information such as
89
medical conditions and predispositions. The Act sets strict guidelines
limiting the use and purpose of the DNA samples to identification
90
only. As for the State’s interests, the court recognized legitimate
91
government interests in accurately identifying arrestees and aiding
92
law enforcement in criminal investigations and prosecutions. Upon
weighing the individual’s interests against the State’s interests, the
Third Circuit determined that the balancing test tipped in favor of the
93
State.

identity outweighs the defendant’s privacy interest in giving a DNA sample as a condition of
pre-trial release where the government’s use of the DNA is limited . . . .”).
83. Id.
84. 652 F.3d 387, 398–99 (3d Cir. 2011).
85. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 112–13 (2001).
86. Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 413–15.
87. See id. (“The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the ‘intrusion occasioned by a
blood test is not significant, since such tests are commonplace . . . and that for most people the
procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain.’” (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 625 (1989))).
88. H.R. REP. NO. 106-900(I), at 27 (2000) (stating that the “genetic markers [were]
purposely selected because they are not associated with any known physical or medical
characteristics, providing further assurance against the use of . . . DNA profiles for purposes
other than law enforcement identification”).
89. See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 401 (pointing out that the use of “junk” DNA ensures that the
government is limited to attaining identification information from the sample, so it will not be
privy to personal information).
90. See id. at 403 (“The mere possibility of such misuse ‘can be accorded only limited
weight in a balancing analysis that focuses on present circumstances.’” (quoting United States v.
Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2007))).
91. The court noted that identification includes ascertaining the arrestee’s criminal history.
Id. at 413.
92. Id. at 413–15.
93. Id. at 416.
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III. HOLDING
In the Maryland Court of Appeals, Alonzo Jay King, Jr. brought
both an as-applied challenge and a facial challenge to the Maryland
94
DNA Collection Act. The court ruled in favor of King on the as95
applied challenge and rejected his facial challenge. First, the court
addressed King’s claim that the Act was unconstitutional as applied to
him because the first acquisition of his DNA sample was not based on
96
any individualized suspicion. Unlike the convicted felon challenging
97
98
the statute in Raines, King had a higher expectation of privacy. The
court held that “the presumption of innocence cloaking the
arrestee”—a presumption absent in Raines—was at the heart of the
99
case. According to the court, until the arrestee is convicted, the
presumption of innocence increases his expectation of privacy and
100
correspondingly reduces the State’s interest. As a result, the court
imposed upon the State “the burden of overcoming the arrestee’s
presumption of innocence and his expectation to be free from
101
biological searches before he is convicted of a qualifying crime.”
The court rejected the State’s argument that obtaining DNA
samples was analogous to a routine booking procedure, such as
102
fingerprinting; a buccal swab, by comparison, is more physically
103
intrusive than fingerprinting. Furthermore, fingerprinting reveals
only the physical characteristics of the individual for identification
104
purposes. In contrast, a DNA sample contains what the court called
94. King v. State, 42 A.3d 549, 553 (Md.), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (No. 12-207).
95. Id. at 580.
96. Id. at 553.
97. See State v. Raines, 857 A.2d 19, 23 (Md. 2004) (“The central issue dealing with the
constitutionality of the Act is whether the collection of DNA from a certain class of convicted
persons is in accord with the protections of the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.”).
98. See King, 42 A.3d at 577 (“Although arrestees do not have all the expectations enjoyed
by the general public, the presumption of innocence bestows on them greater protections than
convicted felons, parolees, or probationers.”).
99. Id. at 563.
100. See id. (“Here, however, the expectation of privacy of an arrestee renders the
government’s purported interests in DNA collection reduced greatly.”). In making this point,
the court presents no case law supporting the notion that there is a correlation betwee the two
interests.
101. Id. at 576.
102. See id. at 574 (noting that even though fingerprinting has been de facto treated as a
routine booking procedure without Fourth Amendment implications, the same approach does
not necessarily apply to DNA sampling).
103. See id. at 576 (“While the physical intrusion of a buccal swab is deemed minimal, it
remains distinct from a fingerprint.”).
104. See id. at 576–77 (“The information derived from a fingerprint is related only to
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105

a “genetic treasure map,” giving the government unique access to an
106
arrestee’s personal information.
The court found no compelling state interest sufficient to
107
outweigh King’s expectation of privacy. The State had already
confirmed King’s identity through other means, including
108
fingerprinting and photographs.
Although the State has a
generalized interest in solving crimes, the court found that this
109
interest did not outweigh King’s expectation of privacy. The court
thus held that the Act, as applied to King, failed to survive Fourth
110
However, King’s facial challenge failed
Amendment scrutiny.
because the court envisioned a conceivable context in which it would
111
be appropriate for an arrestee to submit to a warrantless DNA test.
V. ARGUMENTS
A. Petitioner’s Arguments
The State of Maryland structures its argument according to the
framework of the Knights balancing test, weighing King’s privacy
interests against the State’s interests in collecting and analyzing DNA
112
samples of arrestees. The State argues that King’s post-arrest search
under the DNA Collection Act was reasonable and therefore not a
113
violation of the Fourth Amendment.

physical characteristics and can be used to identify a person, but no more.”).
105. Id. at 577.
106. Id. at 576–77.
107. See id. at 577 (“Convicted felons are not at issue here. The greater expectation of
privacy of an arrestee and the lesser legitimate interest of the State bring concerns about the
privacy of genetic material to a different dynamic in the application of the balancing test.”).
108. See id. at 579 (“[T]he State presented no evidence that it had any problems whatsoever
identifying accurately King through traditional booking routines. King had been arrested
previously, given earlier fingerprint samples, and had been photographed.”).
109. See id. at 578 (“Although we have recognized . . . that solving cold cases is a legitimate
governmental interest, a warrantless, suspicionless search can not [sic] be upheld by a
‘generalized interest’ in solving crimes.”).
110. Id. at 580.
111. See id. (concluding that King’s facial challenge fails because identification through
warrantless DNA testing would be reasonable if “an arrestee may have altered his or her
fingerprints or facial features (making difficult or doubtful identification through comparison to
earlier fingerprints or photographs on records)”).
112. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 13, at 12.
113. Id. at 11.

POST FINAL READ FORMATTED VERSION (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

5/18/2013 5:31 PM

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT SPIRALS DOWN THE DOUBLE HELIX

259

1. An Assessment of the Arrestee’s Interests
The State argues that a search authorized by the Act only
114
minimally intrudes upon the arrestee’s privacy interest. The Act
expressly prohibits the State from using the DNA samples to attain
115
personal information. Supporting this argument is the premise that
statutes should be assessed based on their plain language as opposed
116
to speculative scenarios not provided for by the law. Therefore,
King’s fear that the State could access sensitive information beyond
the arrestee’s identification becomes immaterial when evaluating the
117
constitutionality of the Act.
Furthermore, persons arrested for violent crimes generally have a
118
reduced expectation of privacy. A lawful arrest alters one’s physical
relationship to the State, thus one’s reasonable expectation of privacy
119
correspondingly decreases. Because an arrestee has no legitimate
120
expectation of anonymity, and because the Act primarily serves the
121
purpose of identifying the arrestee, the Act serves a function that
122
the arrestee is unable to evade.

114. Id. at 13–14.
115. See id. at 15 (“When the Court of Appeals expressed concern about the disclosure of
the ‘vast genetic treasure map’ of the human genome, it was ignoring the law as written. What is
at issue in this case is not a search of King’s ‘genes,’ but rather a search for his identity.”).
116. Id. at 14 (noting that an evaluation of the statute requires the court to not “go beyond
the statute’s facial requirements and speculate about ‘hypothetical’ or ‘imaginary’ cases”
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party,
552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008))).
117. See id. at 15–16 (“The privacy interest at stake in this case is only in King’s identity, as
expressed by a short and essentially random sequence of numbers engraved upon every living
cell.”).
118. See id. at 17 (“Lawful arrest fundamentally changes the nature of the individual’s
physical relationship to the State, and correspondingly diminishes the individual’s reasonable
expectation of privacy.”).
119. Id. at 16–19; see also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (“A custodial
arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth
Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional
justification.”).
120. See id. at 18 (“This Court has already ruled that there is no Fourth Amendment right
to anonymity after being lawfully stopped by the police.” (citing Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist.
Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 185 (2004))).
121. Id. at 14.
122. See id. at 18 (“An arrestee may hope that his identity, and thus his participation in
other crimes, goes undiscovered by the State. But ‘the mere expectation . . . that certain facts
will not come to the attention of the authorities’ is not a privacy interest . . . ‘that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable.’” (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122
(1984))).
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Lastly, the State criticizes the Maryland Court of Appeals’
conclusion that the arrestee is cloaked with a presumption of
innocence, which consequently increases the arrestee’s privacy
123
interest. Because the presumption of innocence is part of the trial
right to due process, it does not implicate the Fourth Amendment’s
124
pre-trial application to arrestees. Consequently, it should have no
125
bearing on the arrestee’s expectation of privacy.
2. An Assessment of the State’s Interests
The State argues that it has a compelling interest in accurately
126
identifying people within its custody and that DNA testing provides
127
the most precise means for doing so. Unlike identification via
fingerprinting or photographs, the immutability of a DNA profile
128
makes it impossible to alter. Supervising pretrial detainees is
129
A
another relevant state interest advanced by the Act.
comprehensive identification of pre-trial detainees, provided by DNA
sampling, helps the State (1) determine whether the arrestee should
be charged under recidivist statutes, (2) set bail, (3) make decisions on
institutional security for detainees not released, and (4) set the terms
130
of community supervision for those released.
Finally, the Act facilitates the State’s interest in solving crimes as
131
efficiently as possible. It enables law enforcement to identify
suspects with greater precision, conserve valuable state resources, and
free those who are unjustifiably held as suspects from the scrutiny of
132
the criminal justice system. It also helps to identify dangerous
criminals who otherwise would not have been apprehended without

123. Id. at 20–21.
124. Id. at 20 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979)).
125. Id. at 20–21 (“[T]he presumption of innocence has no application to a determination of
the rights of a pretrial detainee during confinement before his trial has even begun.” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 533)).
126. See id. at 21–22 (“The 2008 extension of the Act to arrestees advances the State’s
interest in accurately identifying people in its custody. King, like many . . . charged with crimes
of violence, remained in state custody pending trial. The State clearly has an interest in knowing
the identities of the people in its custody.”).
127. See id. at 22 (“Not only is DNA analysis the best means of identification, it is
immutable. King could give a false name; he could even change his appearance. But what King
could not do is change the [twenty-six]-number sequence derived from his DNA.”).
128. Id. at 23.
129. Id. at 22.
130. Id. at 22–23.
131. Id. at 23.
132. Id. at 23–25.
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133

the aid of DNA sampling.
Having set all the aforementioned arguments on the scale, the
State contends that its legitimate interests outweigh King’s minimal
134
privacy interests. Hence, the State argues that obtaining King’s
DNA after his arrest was reasonable and did not violate the Fourth
135
Amendment.
B. Respondent’s Arguments
King argues that the Act violates the Fourth Amendment by
permitting the warrantless collection and analysis of DNA from an
136
arrestee. King offers four primary arguments in support of his
position: (1) His DNA test was not authorized by either a warrant or
137
an individualized suspicion; (2) no existing exception to the warrant
138
requirement was applicable; (3) DNA testing is not analogous to
139
fingerprinting; and (4) his privacy interests outweigh any relevant
140
government interests.
141
First, King notes the general requirement that searches are to be
supported by a warrant obtained ex ante by a “neutral and detached
142
magistrate.” The State not only failed to obtain a warrant to conduct
this search, but it also lacked probable cause or individualized
143
suspicion to link King to the rape of Vonette W. six years earlier.
Second, King argues that no existing exception to the warrant
144
requirement applies. Exceptions to the warrant requirement include
145
the “special needs” doctrine and the “search-incident-to-arrest”
133. See id. at 25 (noting that “[t]he facts of this case dramatically underscore the value of
expanding the database to include arrestees charged with violent crimes” because when King
raped Vonette W. at gunpoint, “[h]e did not leave behind his photograph, his fingerprints, or his
name—but he did leave his identity . . . in the form of a string of numbers engraved upon every
cell.”).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Brief for Respondent at 13, Maryland v. King, No. 12-207 (U.S. Jan. 25, 2013).
137. Id. at 18–21.
138. Id. at 34–38.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 46–54.
141. In this case, a search was conducted when law enforcement extracted from King a
DNA sample by means of a buccal swab. Id. at 18–19.
142. Id. at 20.
143. Id. at 20–21.
144. Id. at 23.
145. See, e.g., Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1986) (holding that
roadblocks designed to identify drunk drivers on the road primarily served a public safety
purpose, so the roadblocks did not violate the Fourth Amendment).
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146

doctrine. The “special needs” doctrine applies when the primary
purpose of the government activity extends beyond its general
147
interest in crime control. King argues that crime control is the
primary purpose of DNA testing arrestees because it solves unsolved
148
crimes.
The “search-incident-to-arrest” doctrine is also
149
inapplicable. The doctrine allows police to remove weapons and
search for evidence contemporaneous with the arrest to prevent
150
concealment or destruction. King’s DNA was not evidence of the
151
crime for which he was arrested. King further contends that there is
no valid justification for creating a new exception to the warrant
152
requirement for DNA testing. Even if DNA testing constitutes a
minimal intrusion, and the State has a compelling interest in using
precise testing procedures, these factors do not justify a departure
153
from the warrant requirement.
Third, King argues that DNA testing is not a justified extension of
154
routine booking procedures like fingerprinting. He argues that
155
fingerprinting does not involve an intrusion below the body surface,
so it is not as physically intrusive as DNA testing and therefore
156
infringes less upon an individual’s privacy. Fourth and finally, King
argues that if the Court conducts a balancing test, it should find that
157
his privacy interests outweigh those of the State. The intrusive
nature of DNA testing—both physically and in terms of the amount
of information accessible to the government—tips the scale in his
158
favor. Though King acknowledges that FBI standards prohibit
certain personal information from being extracted from the DNA
146. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) (holding that pursuant to
a lawful arrest, police can search everything associated with the arrestee’s person assuming that
there might be a weapon).
147. Brief for Respondent, supra note 136, at 28; see, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston,
532 U.S. 67, 83–84 (2001) (holding that the “special needs” doctrine did not apply because the
public health rationale for prosecuting mothers whose infants tested positive for cocaine was too
closely entangled with a crime control purpose).
148. Brief for Respondent, supra note 136, at 28.
149. Id. at 33–34.
150. Id.
151. See id. at 34 (“[I]t is undisputed that the [S]tate did not conduct the DNA testing to
link respondent to the alleged assault.”).
152. Id. at 38.
153. Id. at 40–42.
154. Id. at 34–38.
155. Id. at 35.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 45–54.
158. Id. at 45.
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159

material examined, he argues that the State does not account for the
possibility that future scientific advancement will expand the
160
significance of the specific loci selected beyond mere identification.
For these reasons, King argues that the DNA testing was
unreasonable and therefore constitutes a violation of the Fourth
161
Amendment.
V. ANALYSIS
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion granting the State of Maryland’s
motion for a stay of judgment suggests that the Supreme Court will
162
ultimately overturn the Maryland Court of Appeals’s holding. To
grant the stay, Roberts had to find: (1) “a reasonable probability” that
the Court would grant certiorari; (2) “a fair prospect” that it would
reverse the decision below; and (3) “a likelihood that irreparable
163
harm [would] result from the denial of stay.” The first two elements
“[b]oth depend on an individual Justice’s predictions not only of how
he will vote on a future certiorari petition or rule on the merits after
full consideration of a case, but also on how he thinks each of the
164
other Justices will react.” Though Roberts alone granted the stay, in
so doing he was obliged to act “as a surrogate for the entire Court”
and to reach a decision that would “reflect the views of a majority of
165
the sitting Justices.”
In granting the stay, Roberts likely concluded that the majority of
the sitting Justices would overturn the lower court’s decision and
uphold the Act. There are at least three possible approaches the Court
could take to find the Act constitutional. First, the Court could
recognize that King’s privacy interests are diminished because of his
arrestee status. Second, the Court could focus on the fact that the
arrestee has no right to anonymity, so the Act, which is limited to
159. See id. at 46 (“[W]hile it is true that the loci at issue were initially selected because it
was believed that they did not correspond to any particular traits or characteristics, the scientific
understanding is rapidly evolving . . . .”).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 53–54.
162. See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1, 3 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers).
163. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 448 U.S. 1306, 1308 (1980) (Brennan, J., in chambers)
(outlining the three elements required for a motion for stay to be granted).
164. Lois J. Scali, Comment, Prediction-Making in the Supreme Court: The Granting of
Stays by Individual Justices, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1020, 1032 (1985).
165. See Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304, 1313 (1973) (Marshall, Circuit Justice)
(“[W]hen I sit in my capacity as a Circuit Justice, I act not for myself alone but as a surrogate for
the entire Court . . . . A Circuit Justice therefore bears a heavy responsibility to conscientiously
reflect the views of his Brethren . . . .”).
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identifying arrestees only, does not infringe on any legitimate privacy
expectation. Third, the Court could explicitly clarify that an
assessment of an individual’s privacy interests revolves primarily
around the physical intrusiveness of DNA testing. This way, the
Court’s Fourth Amendment analysis of DNA testing will not depend
entirely on whether the science of “junk” DNA evolves.
A. Calibrating the Scale
The balancing test used to determine the reasonableness of a
Fourth Amendment intrusion weighs the individual’s privacy interests
166
against the State’s interests in conducting the search. The Court
could explicitly conclude that an arrestee’s privacy interest is reduced
due to her status as an arrestee. As Knights illustrated, one’s privacy
167
interests are informed by one’s physical relationship to the State. In
Knights, because of the defendant’s reduced expectation of privacy
due to his probationer status, the State’s interest in decreasing
168
recidivism outweighed the defendant’s interests. If the Court takes a
similar approach here, it need not be exact about the extent to which
the arrestee’s privacy interests are reduced. Rather, it would suffice to
determine that the arrestee’s privacy interests are reduced just
enough to make the State’s interests in DNA sampling greater than
169
those of the arrestee’s.
Additionally, the Court may highlight the value of the safeguards
and expungement provisions in the Act. In so doing, the Court would
stress that the Act enables DNA sampling of arrestees solely for
identification purposes. Safeguards include adhering to FBI standards
170
of collecting and analyzing DNA samples, namely using the specific
genetic loci the FBI has identified as optimal for maintaining a

166. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–19 (2001).
167. See id. at 119 (“Just as other punishments for criminal convictions curtail an offender’s
freedoms, a court granting probation may impose reasonable conditions that deprive the
offender of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens.”).
168. See id. at 120 (noting that a major reason why probationers have diminished privacy
interests in comparison to ordinary citizens is because of the fear that they are more likely to
violate the law).
169. See Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust
between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1765 (1994) (“[I]f resolving a clash
of rights is simply a playing of each actor’s rights card and deciding which right is more valuable,
the government’s card . . . almost always will outweigh an individual’s claim of a right to privacy,
especially where the intrusion can be characterized as minimal.”).
170. DNA Collection Act, MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-503 (West 2013); accord id. §
2-502(c)(3).
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database system. This way, the State gains only the information it
172
requires for identification purposes.
The Act also includes
provisions expressing limitations on where the samples are to be
173
174
located, who is granted access to these samples, and the purposes
175
for which the samples can be used. These provisions provide
security after the samples are attained to ensure that they are not
176
misused. Finally, the Act requires the destruction of the DNA
information if “a criminal action begun against the individual . . . does
not result in a conviction of the individual, the conviction is finally
reversed or vacated and no new trial is permitted, or the individual is
177
granted an unconditional pardon.”
Admittedly, despite these safeguard provisions the potential for
abuse remains. However, the Court has previously found in Whalen v.
178
Roe that the risk of abuse leading to the potential misuse of
personal information is insufficient to invalidate a database or other
179
stipulations codified in a statute. By focusing on the safeguard
provisions, the Court can recognize that the combination of these
precautionary requirements limit the utility of the sample analysis to
identification of the arrestee, which the arrestee cannot conceal from
180
the State. If the Court uses the safeguards and expungement
provisions to characterize the Act as accomplishing nothing more
than identifying lawfully arrested individuals, the Court can conclude
171. See Kaye, supra note 40, at 461–62.
172. Shortly after remarking on the unsolved murders and rapes that can be solved by this
DNA technology, Justice Alito questioned why DNA is not the fingerprinting of the twenty-first
century. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Maryland v. King, No. 12-207 (U.S. argued Feb. 26,
2013) (Alito, J.).
173. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504(b).
174. Id. § 2-504(c).
175. Id. § 2-505.
176. See, e.g., id. § 2-502(c)(4) (providing that the Crime Laboratory Director shall “ensure
the security and confidentiality of all records in the statewide DNA data base system”).
177. Id. § 2-511(a)(1)(i)–(iii).
178. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
179. See id. at 603 (holding that a New York law requiring physicians to file prescriptions
with the Department of Health so the Department could maintain a computerized database of
the information, including the patient’s name, was constitutional despite the inescapable risk
that the database could be misused); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, Maryland v.
King, No. 12-207 (U.S. argued Feb. 26, 2013) (Alito, J.) (“[W]here a urine sample is taken to
determine drug use, the urine can be analyzed for all sorts of things . . . and . . . this is a
reasonable search with respect to the determination of whether the person has taken drugs, not
all the other information.”).
180. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122 (1984) (“The concept of an interest in
privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable is, by its very nature, critically
different from the mere expectation, however well justified, that certain facts will not come to
the attention of the authorities.”).
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that concealment of identification is not a recognized privacy
181
interest. At the very least, it is not a privacy interest that elevates
the arrestee’s interests above the State’s.
The State’s interests are undoubtedly substantial. They include
aiding law enforcement within Maryland by resolving previously
182
unsolved crimes, aiding law enforcement efforts of other states and
183
of the FBI, releasing wrongfully held suspects exonerated by DNA
hits, using the most precise means of identification available, and
184
adding efficiency to the criminal justice system. These interests are
185
particularly palpable in this case: After other avenues had failed, the
perpetrator of a previously unsolved rape was discovered six years
186
later through Maryland’s DNA database system. Hence, when the
arrestee’s reduced privacy interests are weighed against the various
state interests in attaining DNA samples of arrestees, the Court may
face minimal difficulty establishing that the balance weighs in favor of
the State’s interests. The fact that Chief Justice Roberts finds it
disconcerting that Maryland will be deprived of this law enforcement
tool, even for a temporary period, suggests that there is some support
on the Court for recognizing the weight of the government interests
187
involved.
181. See Nita A. Farahany, Searching Secrets, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1239, 1280–81 (2012) (“As
identifying information is a set of facts, a suspect can rarely, if ever, claim that such information
contains original expressive content. Consequently, individuals have only a privacy interest in
the seclusion of identifying information, but not in its secrecy.”).
182. Maryland Governor Martin O’Malley made a statement supporting the expansion of
the Act to include DNA testing of arrestees “to more efficiently resolve open criminal
investigations, pursue repeat offenders, and save valuable time pursuing false leads by
effectively eliminating suspects from ongoing investigations.” Press Release, Office of the
Governor of Maryland, O’Malley Testifies on Proposal to Improve Public Safety (Feb. 13, 2008)
(on file with author).
183. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers).
184. See Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 55
(2009) (“DNA testing has an unparalleled ability both to exonerate the wrongly convicted and
to identify the guilty.”); id. (“DNA testing . . . has the potential to significantly improve both the
criminal justice system and police investigative practices.”).
185. The victim was unable to identify her attacker because he covered his face with a ski
mask. Furthermore, he left no fingerprint marks. The only trace left behind was a sample of his
semen recovered from the victim in the hospital. King v. Maryland, 42 A.3d 549, 555.
186. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 13, at 25.
187. See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2012) (Robert, C.J., in chambers) (expressing
concern that if the DNA testing is discontinued pursuant to the Maryland Court of Appeals
decision, severe repercussions will be suffered by the public, the State, other states that rely on
similar databases, and the national database system). But see Transcript of Oral Argument at 3,
Maryland v. King, No. 12-207 (U.S. argued Feb. 26, 2013) (Scalia, J.) (responding to the
empirics the State presented on the efficacy of the Act, Scalia said, “I’ll bet you, if you
conducted a lot of unreasonable searches and seizures, you’d get more convictions too . . . . That
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B. The Evolving Science on “Junk” DNA
The Encyclopedia of DNA Elements (ENCODE), a project
funded by the Human Genome Research Institute, presented new
188
data in 2012 revealing that “junk” DNA may be a misnomer.
According to the ENCODE team, what was thought to be “junk”
DNA turns out to be biochemically active material that regulates the
189
expression of genes and controls hundreds of common diseases.
Even though Maryland’s DNA database follows the FBI standards of
190
testing the specific loci identified as “junk” DNA, ENCODE’s data
suggests that the information the government can access from the
sample is not limited to identification. If ENCODE has correctly
unveiled the true nature of what was previously considered biological
dark matter, the government can gain access to personal information
from DNA samples, including medical susceptibilities and conditions.
Although this new development may create a sensation in the
world of human genome research, it is not as monumental for Fourth
Amendment reasonableness analysis, because the reasonableness
analysis is not driven by the nature of the information being accessed
by law enforcement. The reasonableness analysis has instead focused
191
on the degree of the physical intrusiveness of the search. Professor
Nita Farahany elaborates: “Because an individual cannot claim
authorship over her biometric data, seclusion is the only recognized
privacy interest that these searches could implicate. When seclusion is
proves absolutely nothing”).
188. See The ENCODE Project Consortium, An Integrated Encyclopedia of DNA Elements
in the Human Genome, NATURE (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v489
/n7414/full/nature11247.html.
189. See id. (“These data enabled us to assign biochemical functions for 80% of the genome
. . . providing new insights into the mechanisms of gene regulation. The newly identified
elements also show a statistical correspondence to sequence variants linked to human disease . .
. .”).
190. See Storing Typing Results, MD. CODE REGS. 29.05.01.09(A) (2011) (“Blood, body
fluid, or tissue samples shall be analyzed according to State Police protocol and standard
operating procedures by personnel qualified under the FBI standards and CODIS
requirements.”).
191. Farahany, supra note 181, at 1282. Farahany points out that searches of identifying
information, like biometric data, involve the search of information not authored by the
individual whose sample is attained. Id. Accordingly, that individual has no privacy interest in
the information contained therein, so the relevant question in conducting a privacy inquiry
revolves around the physical intrusiveness of the search. Id. The Court has almost always
focused on the physical nature of the intrusion as opposed to focusing on the nature of the
information to which the government gains access. Id.; see also, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989) (assessing the reasonableness of governmentally
imposed urine tests by focusing on the intrusiveness of the procedure as opposed to focusing on
the extent of information accessible from the samples attained).
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the sole cognizable interest at stake, the physical intrusiveness of the
192
search governs its reasonableness.”
Because the physical
193
intrusiveness of the search is at the heart of the privacy inquiry,
revelations about the type of information certain loci reveal become
194
immaterial. As long as the actual procedure of DNA testing
constitutes a de minimis intrusion, the State’s interests will outweigh
the individual’s privacy interests.
Here, the search consisted of rubbing a cotton swab against the
195
inside of the arrestee’s cheek. The Court has already determined
that more intrusive procedures involving the use of needles to attain
samples below the body surface do not compromise bodily integrity
196
to an inordinate degree.
In comparison, the buccal swab is
minimally intrusive, so King’s privacy interests are not considerably
weighty in comparison to the State’s interests.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is something unsettling about the notion of the government
accessing a bodily sample that has the potential to reveal more about
an individual than the scientific community currently contemplates.
Surely the ENCODE project’s discovery does not mark the apex of
our understanding of the contents of our DNA material. The lack of
confidence in what exactly the government can access when it collects
DNA animates King’s argument that the Act empowers the
government too generously. His concern triggers a recurring question
in Fourth amendment jurisprudence—how much should citizens trust
law enforcement to act reasonably and do the right thing? The
speculative nature of what exactly this DNA material conveys to the
government might differentiate this case from other cases involving
192. Farahany, supra note 181, at 1282.
193. See id. at 1265 (“[W]hether a search reveals a soccer ball or a sex tape, the seclusion
interest is . . . the same. The place upon which law enforcement intruded and the manner and
means used . . . determine the reasonableness of the search.”).
194. In oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts considered the hypothetical individual who
leaves behind her DNA by sipping a glass of water. He suggested that the fact that DNA
material is easily and unconsciously shed may also inform an individual’s expectation of privacy
over her DNA material. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, Maryland v. King, No. 12-207
(U.S. argued Feb. 26, 2013) (Roberts, C.J.) (“[DNA] is not something that people are or can
keep private.”).
195. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 13, at 4.
196. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966) (“[Extraction of blood
samples is] commonplace in these days of periodic physical examination and experience with
them teaches that the quantity of blood extracted is minimal, and that for most people the
procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain.”).
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biometric information. Maryland v. King presents the Court with an
opportunity to consider more than just physical intrusiveness when
assessing the reasonableness of the search. The Court can also
contemplate what level of privacy protections, if any, should extend to
the individual’s informational secrecy. The Court has the chance to
expand the individual’s privacy interests to encompass a secrecy
interest in shielding identifying attributes. Nonetheless, the Court will
likely conform to past precedents by assessing the reasonableness of
DNA testing according to the physical intrusiveness of the procedure.
In so doing, the Supreme Court will likely find Maryland’s DNA
Collection Act constitutional under the Fourth Amendment and
reverse the lower court’s decision.

